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Activists on the steps of the U.S. Capitol at a 1990 rally for the Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
Progeny of the Civi Rights Act of 1964
By Robert D. Dinerstein
s Lawrence Gostin and Henry
Beyer observed more than ten
years ago, "the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) is the
most important piece of federal legis-
lation since the Civil Rights Act of
1964." IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS
wiTH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS
(1993). The comparison is an apt one,
as the ADA not only rivals the 1964
Civil Rights Act (Act) in importance,
but draws substantially from the struc-
ture of that landmark legislation as
well, while extending its antidiscrimi-
nation protection to a new class of
individuals: people with disabilities.
After several attempts during the
1970s and 1980s to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to add nondiscrimi-
nation on the basis of disability, advo-
cates and lawmakers changed direction
in the mid-1980s to push for a stand-
alone statute that would extend the prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination to people
with disabilities. Following extensive
hearings, and with broad bipartisan sup-
port, Congress enacted the ADA in
1990. The legislation had two primary
antecedents. Substantively, it derived
significant content from section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Struc-
turally, the ADA relied heavily on the
1964 Civil Rights Act, with many of its
titles finding parallels in its precursor.
For example, Title I of the ADA, which
bans employment discrimination by pri-
vate employers on the basis of disabili-
ty, parallels Title VII of the Act. Title III
of the ADA, which proscribes discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability in pub-
lic accommodations, tracks Title II of
the 1964 Act while expanding upon the
list of public accommodations covered.
Title II of the ADA, which addresses
discrimination in public services, is
based on section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which, in turn, is
Summer 2004huran rights
based on Title VI of the 1964 Act.
The connection between the two
statutes is further evidenced by Title I of
the ADA's explicit adoption of the Act's
Title VII enforcement provisions for the
investigation and adjudication of
employment discrimination claims. The
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, created by the 1964 Act,
now has authority to investigate disabil-
ity complaints as well as those based on
the Act categories, and has promul-
gated Title I regulations and
important regulatory guidances
interpreting the ADA's employ-
ment provisions.
But if the ADA is in many ways
a logical descendant of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, some critical dif-
ferences between the two statutes
have led to a series ofjudicial inter-
pretations of the ADA that have lim-
ited its scope and cut back on its
anticipated protections. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 protects an indi-
vidual against discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, nation-
al origin, and, in some cases, sex,
without defining these terms and
irrespective of whether the individ-
ual is in the minority within the E
above categories. In contrast, the
ADA defines disability as "a physi-
cal or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."
No matter how egregious the alleged
discrimination may be, an individual
who cannot satisfy the above defini-
tion--especially one who cannot
demonstrate that his or her impairment
is substantially limiting-will not even
be able to challenge the defendant's
actions, let alone prevail on the merits.
To the initial surprise of many experi-
enced legal observers, an extraordinary
number of cases have focused on this
threshold definition, and many courts
have held that individuals with disabili-
ties that the ADA's drafters clearly meant
to cover-for example, diabetes, cancer,
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis-were insuf-
ficiently disabled to meet the statutory
definition.
The ADA definition conundrum
has overshadowed what otherwise
might have been the most significant
difference between the 1964 Act and
the ADA-the nature of discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin as compared to
discrimination on the basis of disabili-
ty. We assume that the former cate-
gories rarely if ever are relevant to the
distribution of societal goods, and thus
ban discrimination outright on these
A 2000 protest against California's
challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court to the
Americans with Disabilities Act
grounds. But disability is sometimes
relevant in ways that race would never
(legitimately) be. Thus, in the work-
place, the ADA's protections extend
not to every individual, or even to
every individual with a disability (as
defined above), but instead to a "quali-
fied individual with a disability," who
is defined as "an individual with a dis-
ability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or
desires." While this definition recog-
nizes that a person's disability some-
times precludes employment, the
inclusion of the concept "reasonable
accommodation" in the statutory defi-
nition (a term found in the 1964 Act,
but defined much more expansively in
the ADA) is an important recognition
that pure equality of circumstances
insufficiently protects the rights of
people with disabilities.
Supporters and opponents of the
ADA alike predicted upon its passage
that much litigation would focus on the
meaning of such opaque terms as "rea-
sonable accommodation," "undue
hardship" and "fundamental alter-
ation" (the latter two terms being
limitations on the nondiscrimination
requirement), and there has certainly
been substantial litigation in these
areas. But the definitional problem
described above has overwhelmed the
substantive litigation under the
statute, and has highlighted one of the
significant Catch-22s in the ADA: if
an individual is "insufficiently dis-
abled," he or she will not be covered
by the statute, but if he or she is "too
disabled," the individual will not be
qualified for the position in question
(or meet program requirements if
suing under Title II or Ill). As a
result, ADA plaintiffs have been
much less successful than plaintiffs
suing under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act in vindicating their right to live
in a discrimination-free society.
Of course, the differential fate of
civil rights plaintiffs in the courts may
say less about the nature of discrimina-
tion than about the tenor of the times in
which we live, and about the conse-
quences of litigating first-impression
statutory claims before a more conser-
vative judiciary. But even if the substan-
tive protections of the ADA have turned
out to be less extensive than many had
hoped, the significant protections the
law has provided, and the powerful
symbolism of a broad-based federal dis-
ability antidiscrimination statute, make
the ADA a worthy successor to the
landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Robert D. Dinerstein is professor of
law and associate dean for academic
affairs atAmerican University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
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